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David Johnson

I became interested in the Honors Program because I saw it as
the best way to get the best possible education at PSU and prepare myself for graduate school. Little did I know that I would
suffer a near overdose of Plato and that egotist Augustine. But
I'm the better man for it all. Though I wonder what Freud
would say about my development.
Because I have the desire to drown myself in books, I am heading off to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign to
see what kind of trouble I can find in the third largest academic library in the United States. As a side pursuit, I will be
undertaking graduate studies in modern German history with
hopes of eventually earning my Ph. D. Along the way, I hope
to get back to Germany a couple of times, disguising my quest
of following the Fussball Bundesliga with research in Germany's
big libraries and archives.
Kurt Tucholsky was born in Berlin in 1890. He served on the
eastern front in the First World War, but was involved in supplies and did not see combat. Returning' from the war,
Tucholsky turned all his attention to writing. Working primarily for the weekly Weltbuhne, he wrote under five names,
including his own. In 1933, the Nazis burned his writings. In
1935, disillusioned with his native Germany and terribly
depressed about the state of his own life, he committed suicide
at his home in Sweden.

Kurt Tucholsky:
Left-Wing Intellectual and
Politically-Engaged Journalist
In the political culture of the Weimar Republic, there were
few calm moments. Chaos, irony, and paradox moved through
the currents of time without causing the least bit of surprise.
Harold Poor has written: "Creativity and chaos, brilliance and
stupidity, mania and calm, paradox and contrast-such was
Weimar" (Poor, 66). There was an explosion of cultural activity, as Expressionism tested the limits, theater experimented with
new forms, and the new media of film thrilled the masses. But
there was also the rise of political violence; tolerated by many
and even explicitly encouraged by others. The economy, ravaged by wartime policies, remained weak and vulnerable to the
vicissitudes of the world markets. Above all, Germany was beset
by a confrontation between the values of the old Reich and
those now engendered by the new Republic. The times were far
from stable.
In this environment of confrontation and chaos, Kurt
Tucholsky operated in the intellectual sphere. He was a left-wing
intellectual and journalist, writing against the authoritarian values of the Wilhelmine Reich and in support of republican ones.
The words which came from his typewriter were in opposition
to the intdlectual traditions of the old Reich and the militaristic
and authoritarian values professed by the old guard. Tucholsky
saw the militaristic values of the old Reich re-emerging. It was
these values which, Tucholsky believed, had to be overcome if
the Republic was to have a long and fruitful future.
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Critics of intellectuals have focused on the naive idealism of
intellectuals and their tendency to withdraw from the political
theater, instead concentrating on their respective specialties.
Tucholsky did not fit into this group of intellectuals, as he was
an active participant in the political debates of the day. He
polemicized, satirized and criticized. He wrote poems and
cabarets. When he saw a theme which needed to be addressed,
he tackled it; often many times. He focused on real issues. His
methods of satire and criticism were purposefully used to highlight the real problems faced by Germany. Tucholsky may have
not been an active member of a political party, but he definitely
was a politically-engaged journalist. He did have a voice worth
hearing. Focusing his criticism on the government institutions of
the Wilhelmine Reich, Tucholsky above all targeted the military
as the major threat to the new Republic. The military's influence
stretched throughout society, even to the traditionally pacifistic
Social Democratic Party. It was this pervasive infl uence and the
corresponding respect and adulation the military enjoyed from
the German public that Tucholsky believed must be destroyed.
Concentrating on the early years of the Weimar Republic, specifically 1919 to 1922, this paper will seek to prove the worth of
Tucholsky's voice and the value of his efforts for the republicanization of Germany.

I
Prior to the First World War, there had been in Germany a
strong distinction between the roles of the intellectual and the
politician. The world of the intellectual was limited to the arena
of ideas. He debated the trends within intellectual fields with
colleagues, but left the political tasks to politicians. So long as
one had personal and inner freedom, and this freedom was protected, there was no need for intellectuals to confront the
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Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and other politicians
over the control of the political realm. Most intellectuals were
content with the stability provided by the Reich, especially when
they compared their situation to the autocracy of Russia and the
corrupted liberalism of France (Stern, 17).
Out of this contentment, Fritz Stern has argued a "Vulgar
Idealism" developed in Germany after its 1871 unification
(Stern, 17).1 In comparison to the idealism of the early nineteenth century, which had its roots in the Enlightenment and
which had stressed equality of men, "Vulgar Idealism" instead
stressed the superiority of German culture over foreign counterparts. Stern believed that this new idealism was passively consumed, elevated, and represented a claim to an exclusive proprietorship of Kultur (Stern, 17).2 With the rise of "Vulgar
Idealism," there emerged en masse the unpolitical: German, who
denounced mass society, democracy, liberalism, modernity, and
other "imports" from the west (Stern, 18). There was no concern for practical matters, as these so-called unpolitical
Germans dogmatically opposed realism, pragmatism, and materialism. These Germans justified their anathema toward politics
by stressing their cultivated minds, which would only be soiled
by involvement in politics. However, their idealized Kultur did
have political effects, as social divisions within Germany were
widened and sanctified (Stern, 19). Through the forces of
Kultur, these unpolitical Germans, sought to fight the growing
threat to the status quo by the working class. Kultur was hence
elevated to a level unapproachable by the uneducated. Stern has
written that this concept of Kultur was " .. .invested with the
1. Not only the intellectuals were content with the political situation, but also was
the vast majority of the bourgeoisie. I am focusing soldy on intdlecruals due to
space and ,How of argument.
2. The English word culture is not a suitable translation for Kultur. Kultur embodies much more: civilization, state of mind, etc.
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awe and reverence that Germans felt, or thought they should
feel, for the diverse creations of the spirit, for the mystery of the
arts that to so many possessed a voice as tender and as powerful
as religion itself" (Stern, 5). Accordingly, this development of
meaning for Kultur could be nothing but unfavorable to the
development of democracy or of a cohesive society within
Germany (Stern, 6). Irresponsibility and iniquity were rationalized. With this rejection of participatory politicS and idealization of Kultur by the majority of intellectuals, came a great productivitywithin the intellectual and scientific spheres. This productivity seemed to justify the split between politics and intellectual activity. As Stern argues, with the outbreak of war in
1914, many believed the coming struggle would demonstrate
the superiority of German Kultur in comparison to the selfish
ideals and institutions of the west (Stern, 20).3 These were the
nationalistic feelings which overtook Germany as a whole in
August of 1914. Along with this elevation of Kultur came a
loyal adulation and respect for the military and its values of obedience, order, discipline, and strict control.

II
As the war dragged on and the assumed inevitable victory
never came, there bred a disenchantment among German society in their once optimistic feelings towards the war. Among
some intellectuals, the British blockade of Germany and the
resulting privation for the German population produced a

change in attitude. There was a growing social protest among
intellectuals against the values of German bourgeois society.
3. Stern writes that there has been a misinterpretation of Germany being militaristic
in 1914. He bdieved that the great enthusiasm of 1914 was not due to militarism
or chauvinism, but rather due to the decades·long search for the moral equivalent
of war. In the war they had found their equivalent of morality
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The historians Istvan Deak and Peter Gay have both seen this
protest symbolically as a father-son conHict. 4 The son, representing democracy, modernity, and progress, was poised against
the father, who embodied the conventional order, philistinism,
and capitalism. It was the Fatherland that was guilty of over-discipline and the betrayal and misleading of the younger generation. The father's world had, therefore, to be repudiated so that
Germany could join the community of nations in peace (Deak,
69-70). It was a struggle over the interpretation and control of
Kultur and for the future of Germany. Instead of the ritualistic
repeating of past German cultural accomplishments, there had
to be a progressive, ever-creative, and modern .KUlturdeveloped. 5
When Germany had finally lost the war, and the
Revolution came in November of 1918, there arose a great
euphoria among left-wing intellectuals. 6 These left-wing intellectuals believed that they were destined to play an important
role in the reshaping of Germany after the war (Deak, 68).
These intellectuals saw themselves as those justified to shape
the new post-war Germany and viewed the future optimistically. In contrast to the ubiquity of the unpolitical attitude
before the war, many intellectuals began outlining possible
structures of government and plans for their future political
involvement. There was widespread confidence in the coming
birth of a new socialist state. "Forward" became the only direction for their thought. According to Peter Gay, the cultural task
of these intellectuals was to restore the broken ties which the
4. Peter Gay, Outsitkr as Insider, and Deak., We/mars left-Wing Intellectuals.
5. An example for such a change in attitude could be found in Thomas Mann.
Mann had published ObsmJations ofan Unpolitical Man in 1918, espousing the
vinues of the politically uninvolved intellectual. In the early years of the
Republic. Mann's attitude would change, eventually leading up to his novd The
Magic Mountain (1924), which stressed the need for political involvement.
6. "Left-wing" intellectuals is a term used to describe intellectuals who were either
Marxists anellor sympathetic to leftist ideas.
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war had caused in German society (Gay, 8). An example for
this new activism could be seen in Kurt Hiller. According to
Hiller, the new German state would be run by intellectuals,
echoing the platonic vision of rule by philosopher kings/
Hiller went so far as to layout the fundamental laws of the new
state (Deak, 71).8 Even the famed architect Walter Gropius
realized a social responsibility because of the lost war and the
resulting exposure of the bankruptcy of German Kultur. He
said: "This is more than just a lost war. A world has come to
an end. We must seek a radical solution to our problems"
(Gay,8-9).
A belief in the inviolability of the intellect circulated
among these intellectuals. 9 The power of the intellect would
enable condemnation of the father and fatherland and allow a
spiritual regeneration and universal reconciliation (Deak, 70).
With this increased sense of their worth, intellectuals
approached the revolutionary days full of hope. For the journalists of the weekly Weltbahne, Istvan Deak writes, the future
(( ... inspired optimism in the possibility of humanity's ethical
and social regeneration" (Deak, 68). Among the writers for the
Weltbahne was Kurt Tucholsky.
The euphoria however did not last long. Many intellectuals
quickly soured on the Republic. As government-sponsored
Freikorps paramilitary groups restored order and suppressed revolutionary activity, a general aversion towards the government
7. Plato laid out this vision in the Republic. Those educated in the proper methods and in the proper material would be the rulers of society.
8. Among these laws: War was to be outlawed; there would be an equal distribution of all material goods as well as a minimum wage; and suppression of parliament if they opposed the will of the intdlect. The last law reflected Hiller's
faith in the power of reason.
9. Such a concept reminds one of the ideas of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the power of reason, the inviolability of the intellect, and a bdief in
inevitable progress.
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resurfaced among many intellectuals. 1o With the passing of the
Weimar constitution, many intellectuals objected to the remnants of the old imperial regime that remained in the Republic,
namdy the bureaucracy, the judicial system, and most importantly, the military.
Once optimistic over the promise of the Republic, many leftwing intellectuals now became disgusted with the system. The
hopes for a state governed by intellectuals were quickly crushed
by the political realities. These intdlectuals had never had any
recourse to power. They had .no trade union, no paramilitary
group backing their interests, and they had not been among
those politically active in the old Wilhdmine Reich. ll The party
that would have been the most logical fit for voicing their interests, the Social Democratic Party, these left-wing intellectuals
found dull and its leadership intellectually weak and feebleminded (Laqueur, 47-48). The leaders of the SPD were, moreover, too conservative in their cultural views.
In the leaders of the SPD, many left-wing intellectuals saw
petty-bourgeois aspirations. According to Walter Laqueur, leftwing intellectuals discovered that even among the workers there
existed hopes for "bourgeois philistinisni' (Laqueur, 48-49). The
SPD leaders were mere functionaries whose only desire, next to
entering the bourgeoisie, appeared be among the workers, drinking beer and playing cards. A new Bebd, a Marx, a new Lassalle,
or some other charismatic leader had not emerged. Instead, the
10. The Free Corps were paramilitary groups organized to maintain order in German
cities and prevent an ovenhrow of the provisional republican Government by the
Spanacists and other leftist groups. Unfortunately, these Free Corps went beyond
their limits of power and murdered and beat suspected revolutionaries, often without retribution for these actions.
11. KUrt Hiller did try to organize intellectuals into the Rat der Geistiger Arbeiter.
However, the interests and egos of the intellectuals that did join could not be
combined into a workable council. The council passed away rather quicldy.
KUrt Tucholsky was never a member.
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leaders of the SPD were weak, irresolute, and uninspIrIng
(Laqueur, 50). Few intellectuals joined the party. Many intellectuals felt themselves alienated from such a party, and intellectually and culturally superior to the bourgeoisie and those workers
striving to become members of it. Laqueur seems to be transposing a similar idea to Stern's concept of "Vulgar Idealism" onto
left-wing intellectuals. Again an idealized, non-existent culture is
used to define strata in society. Left-wing intellectuals, earlier
enthusiastic over political involvement, again became unpolitical
due to their belief in the superiority of their thought (Laqueur,

48-49).12
This avoidance of an alliance by left-wing intellectuals with
the SPD has often been criticized by historians. Laqueur
writes:
Whatever [the left-wing intellectuals] did or refrained from doing
was of no public interest except to provide grist to the mills of
Goebbels and Alfred Rosenberg. The struggle proceeded in the
streets, the political assemblies, the beer-halls, the party headquarte~s, anywhere but the places frequented by the intellectuals.
(Laqueur, 71).

According to Laqueur, the intellectuals were isolated from the
real world. They were unaware of the real situations faced by
Germans, and did nothing to seek these out. Nor did they fight
for their ideals in parliament. The public took no interest in
the intellectuals because they took no interest in the public.

12. It is interesting that the SPD leaders viewed these intdlectuals with the same
degree of contempt. According to many in the SPD, the intellectuals had no
interest in performing the necessary day to day tasks. Instead, they immersed
themsdves in utopian and futuristic visions, while neglecting pragmatic and real
concerns. The intdlectuals lacked political judgment and tactical ability. There
was no place for them in a party specifically designed to work for the real interests of the working class.
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III
Lack of public interest was certainly a dilemma for left-wing
intellectuals and above all, for Kurt Tucholsky. Tucholsky has
been called a foe of the Republic; a writer unable to recognize the
ettent of freedom the Republic offered in comparison to that
before the war (Zwerenz, 57). Such criticism seems to be influenced by GUf knowledge of the end of the Weimar Republic. For
example, Laqueur writes that Tucholsky and other intellectuals
would be enlightened to the error of their ways by the brutality
of the Nazi dictatorship (Laqueur, 45-47). Such a statement
demonstrates the benefit of hindsight.
While a quick skimming of his works might lead one to
believe Tucholsky was against the Republic, criticism of this kind
is unwarranted when Tucholsky's writings are thoroughly studied. He was indeed a supporter of the Republic. Tucholsky was
not fighting against the existence of the Republic, he was instead
combating the weaknesses and hypocrisies of the democracy and
the refusal of government representatives to overcome these
shortcomings. Foremost among these shortcomings was the
ongoing influence of the conservative-reactionary class, and the
unfortunate adaptation of the SPD to this influence (Zwerenz,
57). Tucholsky was seeking to inform the public of its misplaced
loyalty to such values. That he was not a loyal advocate and blind
supporter of governmental policies should not be considered a
weakness, rather a virtue". His calls for greater reform should not
be seen as misguided, but as constructive attempts to ameliorate
living conditions and Germany's standing in th.e world.
Tucholsky wanted to improve the Republic, not destroy it.
Tucholsky was also not rejecting politics, only certain policies. He was not the against the SPD as a political party, only
against its leaders who advocated and implemented poor policies
(HeB, 92). The worst example of such a poor and short-sighted
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policy was the SPD's agreement with the military on the 10th of
November, 1918 (Kolb, 13).1,3 This agreement helped the military recover its strength and confidence after the lost war. It also
reawakened the influence of the military in German society.14
Despite Tucholsky's disappointment with the weak SPD
leadership, he did not join the Communist Party. To him, the
Communists were undemocratic and authoritarian. Tucholsky's
heart lay with the workers, but he held no utopian visions of a
coming worker's paradise. He believed it was his responsibility to
remain on the outside, to point out errors and possible threats to
the Republic. His job as critic, according to Gerhard Zwerenz,
was to " ... desanctify sacred cows; he did not have to become
their herdsman in the process" (Zwerenz, 86). Tucholsky sought
a society where everyone would have equal opportunities to
increase their standard of living and well-being. That he felt
more empathy for the historically-suppressed worker was based
on the greater barriers to advancement which the worker faced.
, Many left-wing intellectuals were indeed idealistic and ign'orant of the real world, but a few did manage to create for themselves a voice that was heard; a voice that held true to ideals
which corresponded to political realities. An example of such an
intellectual was Maximillian Harden. Harden had been a vocal
critic of governmental policies and social traditions in the
Wilhelmine years and continued his criticism into the Republic.
Harden had been very much involved in the happenings of his
13. The agreement was reached by the SPD leader and later Republic President
Friedrich Ebert and the head of the General Sta.ft General Groener. In this agreement, the SPD and the military sought to maintain peace and order and to prevent the seizure of power by the radical left, represented foremost by the
Spartacists. The military pledged its loyalty to the SPD led government and its
support of the founding of a Republic. Unforrunately, this "maintenance" of order
resulted in countless murders of leftists and republican sympathizers
14. For the historiography of this agreement, see Kolb. Die Weimarer Republik.
157-82.
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day and was a significant political figure, even if he never held an
office. The ideas of a writer like Harden cannot simply be dismissed as naive and idealistic. These ideas represented a voice of
opposition that reflected the period and its events. That Harden
was active for many years suggests the relevance of his writings.
Somebody had to be reading him in order to justify his continued employment.
Kurt T ucholsky was an intellectual in the spirit of
Maximillian Harden. Like Harden, and in contrast to other leftwing intellectuals of the day, Tucholsky approached the future of
Germany very cautiously and pragmatically. He refrained from
idealistic visions of an intellectual-led Republic. Tucholsky was
an engaged journalist, commenting often on the political happenings of the day. Further, Tucholsky was consistent in his message and his style. In his writings, Tucholsky's subject matter and
objects of criticism remained constant. He did not let up.
Such consistency was evident in Tucholsky at an early age. In
a 1911 visit to Prague, he was able to meet Franz Kafka. This
meeting made enough of an impression on Kafka that he noted
it in his diary. He called Tucholsky an "entirely consistent person" (Poor, 12). Such an impression of the then law student
Tucholsky by an astute observer like Kafka points to the intensity Tucholsky brought to his life even in his early days. Such
intensity would never leave Tucholsky.
Tucholsky was not a passive observer but an involved and
critical one. In comparison to other left-wing intellectuals
who withdrew from the scene, Tucholsky remained: polemicizing and propagandizing. He displayed the most energy,
insight, and satiric brilliance of any left-wing intellectual
active at this time (Poor, 5). He was a keen observer. In
October of 1918, he wrote a letter to his fiancee Mary
describing the importance of the coming weeks: "One is
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allowed quite well to say that the fate of Germany for the
next 200 years depends on the next few weeks" (Tucholsky,
412)}5 He sensed the coming revolution and quite possibly
the abdication of Wilhelm II and the establishment of a new
political and social order.16 In the same letter he also
addressed a theme he would stress often after the founding of
the Republic; that of the ongoing adulation Germans professed for military and authoritarian values. He wrote: "The
mistakes, which we have criticized and continue to criticize,
have not been wiped froin the Germans, instead only pushed
just under the surface [heruntergesetzt]; these mistakes are not
in the open-but are nevertheless still alive" (Tucholsky,
412). These mistakes were the adulation of the military and
belief in the cultural superiority of Germany; the same values
held by the "Vulgar Idealists" before the war.17 Tucholsky
would fight against these traits diligently and prolifically. He
was a key figure in the history of the Republic and also a symbol for it. He represented the freedoms gained; The freedom
to write freely and without censorship; the freedom to criticize and to make suggestions.
Tucholsky wrote for many newspapers and journals, but
he contributed most often to the Weltbuhne, the weekly journal that served to comment on both the political and cultural
scene in Germany from a leftist perspective. The Weltbuhne
15. From a letter dated the 23rd of October, 1918. Tucholsky, Ausgewiihlte Briefl,
1913-1935.
16. The Revolution he sensed broke out on November 9th, 1918 with the founding the of the Republic. The Kaiser abdicated two days later.
17. "Vulgar Idealism" is of course a term coined by Fritz Stem. I use it here and later
in the paper to describe the values ofTucholsky's targets for criticism.
18. Tucholsky also wrote under four pseudonyms plus his own name. Yet. he never
hid the true writer behind the name. He was not seeking to protect himself from
what he wrote. See 'Wlr Aile Funrin Kurt Tucholsky, Gesammelte Werke, Band
I. 1041-1043. Also Kurt Koszyk. Die deutsche Presse, 285.
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had a small circulation, 16,000 at its peak (Koszyk, 285).18
This small circulation would seem to confirm Laqueur's view
that indeed, these intellectuals were only writing for themselves. Others have argued, however, that the Weltbuhnewas in
fact significant beyond the realm of unpolitical left-wing intellectuals (Mosse, 173). The Weltbuhne was on newsstands
throughout Europe and was read regularly by responsible
members of the rightist intelligentsia as well as by the left
(Poor, 66), Although the Weltbuhne never enjoyed widespread
popularity, it was significant, presenting weekly a consistent
message representing the left intelligentsia in Germany. Kurt
Koszyk has written that ",., [the Weltbuhne's] significance lay
primarily in the fact that it brought the opinions of an important political group to weekly expression" (Koszyk, 285). That
the Weltbuhne was read by even those on the right-who used
its content for their own dubious means-provides evidence
of its significance.
Th:is significance, however, does not clarify the effectiveness ofTucholsky as an individual writer. Laqueur singles out
Tucholsky as providing an example for the ineffectiveness of
left-wing intellectual activity. While he calls Tucholsky the
" ... most brilliant and most fertile German satirist since
Heinrich Heine," these brilliant writings only served the interests of the far right (Laqueur, 45),19 Due to the anti-monarchical and anti-military content of such writings, the left-wing
intellectuals were called traitors and named symbols of the
decadent republic. Moreover, Laqueur states that writers such
as Tucholsky were not thankful for the freedoms they pos-

19. Laqueur primarily bases his criticism of T ucholsky on his later writings. when
Tucholsky was personally frustrated and distraught over the course of Weimar
politics. It was in these days that Tucholsky wrote more often for Communist
publications. He, however, did not join the party.
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sessed. According to Laqueur, these writers argued that
Germany was more reactionary than ever, including seemingly Republic-friendly politicians, from Gustav Stresemann to
even the SPD.20 Laqueur states that even Tucholsky was not
immune to falling into this helpless political isolation
(Laqueur, 45-47).
Unfortunately, Tucholsky's writings would prove to be
ineffective. They did not lead to a strong republic, filled with
open-minded Germans. This failure, however, was not the
result of self-imposed isolation and by political naivete on the
part of Tucholsky. He knew exactly what was occurring in
Germany and wrote incessantly about it.
It was not Tucholsky's job to save the Republic. He was a
journalist reporting and commenting on what he observed.
To hold the journalist responsible for supplying solutions is
problematic. Tucholsky made suggestions, and he also pointed out the necessity of reform and the consequences if it
were not carried out. He sought to enlighten and persuade
his readers through his voluminous writings. That circulations were small should not be held against him. He did not
rely solely on idealistic visions but also emphasized the need
for real, and very possible reform. Anton Austermann has
written, "That kind of Journalism was foreign to him which
was distant from the public reality and existent only in private and exclusive conversation with the societal powers"
(Poor, 9). Tucholsky was seeking to speak directly with the
masses, calling on them to personally rid themselves of the
burdens of servility to the Prussian Herrschaft (King, 40). By
doing so, the old system would collapse from its own weight.
His readers were enlightened wittily, satirically, and with
20. Stresemann was Chancellor of the Republic for three months in 1923 and
Foreign Minister from 1923 to 1929.
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charm over the contemporary reality of communications
(Austermann, 14).21
Because Tucholsky used satire and criticism as his methods of
style, one could easily pass Tucholsky's writings off ~ not appropriate for a mass audience, as they required a certain level of education for purposes of comprehension. His methods corresponded neith~r to the well-to-do nor to the existing political
partieS ot institutions. They instead appealed to those disillusioned with politics and not to the fundamental values of regular German citizens, due to Tucholsky's primary focus on the
negative aspects of German society (HeB, 38),22 Tucholsky, however, during the first years of the Republic, did focus on topics
important and relevant to all Germans, That he used satire and
criticism to portray these topics should not take away from the
seriousness and effort Tucholsky devoted to enlightening the
German public to the real problems of the day. Harold Poor
addresses this judgment as he observes Tucholsky's methods.
According to Poor, Tucholsky often did state idealistic, vague,
and often hopeless goals, but he examined individual government policies and actions as well, on a practical level (Poor, 8687). Tucholsky would point out errors and offer suggestions for
their rectification. 'While it was true that Tucholsky held up the
ideal of a more humane and democratic culture, he also knew
this ideal could not be ingrained in the minds of the Germans
21. Anton Austermann sees Tucholsky as the great Historiograph of the Weimar
Republic as his works serve as a chronological reflection and informal history of
the Republic. The major events of the period are portrayed in his writings. He
is more popular today than ever. Up to 1980, over 6 million copies of volumes
of his work have been saId.
22. Dieter HeR, "Personalisierung als Strategie. Kurt Tucholskys publizistische
Auseinandersetzung mit den sozialistischen Parteien der Weirnarer Republik" in
Kurt Tucholsky Sieben Beitrage zu Werk und Wirkung, ed. Irmgaard
Ackermann, 96~7. Golo Mann as quoted in William John King, Kurt
Tucholsky als politischer Publizist. 38.
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overnight. It could only be achieved in the classrooms and in
reforms of government institutions. By this slow, gradual, and
patient process, the inner spirit of society might be changed
(Poor, 86-87). He used criticism and satire to enlighten his fellow Germans about the corruption and abuses committed by
the old institutions in order to prevent these past sins from
being repeated. 23 While Tucholsky was rejecting the old institutions, he was simultaneously propagating democratic values
which, he hoped, would lead Germany into a peaceful and productive future.
In two articles from 1919, "Was darf die Satire?" and "Wir
Negativen," Tucholsky defended his satirical and critical
approach. Tucholsky saw satire as an " ... absolutely positive
method" (Tucholsky, 362). He added: "Nowhere else are those
lacking character more quickly exposed" (Tucholsky, 362).
Further, exaggeratIon was necessary at this time in order to " ...
blast open the truth, so that it becomes more clear" (Tucholsky,
363). No one should be kept safe from the satirist's gaze.
According to Tucholsky, there was " ... no upstanding man or
class that should not be able to take criticism" (Tucholsky, 364).
Satire had to have no limits. Otherwise, the real truth could not
be learned by the German public.
In "Wir Negativen," Tucholsky fully addressed his critics. He
could not affirm a society in which a sizable number of its citizens remained anti-republican and undemocratic. This was the
" ... central point of Germany's current misery" (Tucholsky, 372).
Germany was a land of soldiers, totally lacking in culture, and a
land where the worst instincts of its citizens were constantly
aroused and encouraged (Tucholsky, 373). In response to this
23. See Tucholsky's piece "Wir Negativen" for a classic example of his methods.
Kurt Tucholsky, Gesammdte Werke, Band I, 372-377. See also King,
Tucholsky, 38.
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situation, Tucholsky laconi~ly asked: "And to' that we should
say yes?" (Tucholsky, 373) Tucholsky, however, was not writing
out of hatred for Germans. He wrote: "We want to fight with
hate out of reasons of love. We are struggling out of love for the
repressed, who must not necessarily always be proletarians. We
love the thoughts of humanity which lie in the thoughts of
humans" (Tucholsky, 377). In order for these humanitarian
thoughts to spread and prosper, a change in the attitude and
character of Germans had to transpire:
We should make positive suggestions. But all the positive sugges~
dons benefit nothing, if the correct level of honesty and integrity to
do not move through the land. The reforms, in which we believe,
are not to be implemented with regulations, nor with imperial
offices. We do not believe that it suffices to build up a filing cabinet
and a large, multi~faceted personnel to settle this problem. What is
needed is the proper chiracter[anstiindige GesinnuniJ. (Tucholsky,
375~76)

This proper character was to be obtained not only through
reform of institutions but through emphasis on educational
reform and promotion of positive German culture, which
stressed freedom of ideas and freedom of the individual to
make his or her own choices. What was collectively done to
improve the situation should in no way interfere with individual freedom (Tucholsky, 375).
According to Tucholsky, there were two Germanys. One was
free, the other servile (knechtisch) (Tucholsky, 993). In order for
the free Germany, represented by the Republic, to win this struggle, there must be propaganda made for it. Unfortunately,
Tucholsky saw few defenders of or advocates for the Republic
because few republicans were in decisive positions within the
Republic (Tucholsky, 993). There existed no widespread move125

ment in support of the Republic. According to Jorg Schonert,
Tucholsky's use of satire and criticism·, therefore, was part of his
strategy for achieving positive results through negative means.
Through unconditional attacks he sought to point out the negatives and remnants ~f the old system and to establish a common
interest in the establishment of a thorough renewal of Germany
(Schonert, 80). Further, Schonert believes Tucholsky's methods
were an example of the bourgeois tradition of the Enlightenment
which strove for a better morality and a free society and sought
to preserve these values in the face of constant attacks (Schonert,
82). Criticism and satire were legitimate and traditional tools in
this form of struggle (Schonert, 82).
Tucholsky was indeed not politically isolated, as Laqueur
believes, but rather politically involved. In referring to left-wing
intellectuals and with no doubt, Tucholsky as well in mind, Kurt
Koszyk writes: "These so-called outsiders partly formed the
image of the Republic. Therefore, the Republic was identified
with their names" (Koszyk, 284). Through this identification
came also, for Tucholsky, evidence of his involvement in the
Republic.
Tucholsky recognized his own problematic and ambivalent
relationship to the Republic (HeB, 108). He recognized he was
an intellectual serving as a critic of a Republic he supported but
in which he saw many dangerous flaws. Dieter HeB writes that
Tucholsky's detachment from both the left and the right enabled
and legitimized his criticism and warnings (HeB, 108). He was a
-journalist reporting and commenting on the shortsightedness
and the shortcomings of governmental policies. Tucholsky himself saw his own role as follows:
The world must not be seen entirely from above; isolated. against
and distant from everyone. Instead. one must be among the mass-
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es--as leader, or adversary, or aristocrat, or monk, but among the
masses. The journal, in which it can say that it belongs to one or to
all is good; the deed that an individual can do with all or for all is
even better. (Koszyk,285).14

With this statement, Tucholsky does not fit into the generalizations of Laqueur. 25 Tucholsky indeed recognized the need to
understand the masses, but also to make the effort to be among
them andt~ influence them. As will be shown below, Tucholsky
was an active participant in the Weimar Republic, especially in
its early years. He cannot be dismissed as a mere source for
rightist propaganda. He actively wrote propaganda for his own
cause. Although he was not a government official, he nevertheless used words as his deeds. He was writing the good fight.
Tucholsky did not fall back on utopian visions of society
(Zimmerman, 109). He approached his work pragmatically. He
did not join specific intellectual organizations, nor did he
become a long-time member of a political party (Austermann,
20).26 That he was not an active member of a political party can
be a point for criticism. However, one need not be an active
party member to be a political participant. Although Tucholsky
was writing in an age without television or even widespread
radio, the subject matter he addressed and criticized was politically-oriented and his criticism did not go unnoticed by politicians (Tucholsky, 3).27 He possessed a voice which came often
24. Quote by Tucholsky, 1927.
25. See above.
26. Tucholsky did join the Independant Socialists (USPD) for a short time from
March 1920 to 1922, when the Independents joined the Majority Social
Democrats (SPD). As mentioned before, Tucholsky was never a member of the
Rat der Geistiger Arbeiter.
27. Above all, politicians of the Right and the Nazis were very aware of his political
writings. In 1933, Tucholsky was in the first group of authors to have their
books burned by the Nazis. His writings were burned on May 10, 1933.
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and consistently. Anton Austermann believes that Tucholsky
had the confidence that he could playa positive role from the
position of being a sharp critic of the existing political conditions. From this vantage point, he could excite self-action in
those affected by these conditions. At least initially, Tucholsky
believed, according to Austermann, that an oath of all contemporaries of good will could be taken to uphold honesty
(Redlichkeit), humanity, functional work (sachliche Arbeit), and
the preeminence of the individual before the corporation and
collectives (Austermann, 20).28 Such hopes displayed a connection to Enlightenment thought which optimistically believed in
the progressive betterment of man through education.
Tucholsky indeed held such hopes.
Although writing in 1930, Tucholsky described his long-held
goal of creating a new Germany:
From Teutschland must Deutschland be made, and it must also be
shown that besides Hitler, Hugenberg und those fochkalten
University types of the year 1930, there are still other kinds of
Germans. Every reader can participate in this effort. If he does that
in his own district through the deed, that will be our highest
achievement. (Austermann, 53)29

Tucholsky sought the active participation of his readers to help
in changing the system. He hoped that Germany would begin
with a tabula rasa, ensuring a building up of new values and
the complete destruction of the experiences and behavior evident in the Wilhelmine period. In so doing, Tucholsky wrote,
28.Later, Tucholsky experienced great discouragement due to realization
that majority of Germans were unwilling to commit to new values.
29. Teutschland refers to a Germany led by teutonic warriors whose present
embodiment was the Prussian military. Deutschland referred to what
Germany should be. Fischkalten refers to people who are resistant to
new ideas.
128

"The claim of authority held by such institutions as the military, church, bureaucracy, and justice system would be effectively shaken to their foundations" (Schonert, 81).30 Tucholsky
believed it was his job to influence, as best he could, public
support for the Republic. If that meant using satire and
emphasizing democratic and humane ideals, he would utilize
those means. Austermann confirms this approach:
In face of the power of latent and open anti-republican propaganda
in the Weimar Republic, Tucholsk)r believed that the survival of the
Republic was far more dependent upon more than just an education
campaign that merdy rested on the better argument. The majority
of the German population was only to be won to the side of the
Republic through sharp, immediate altercations with the antirepublican forces. Propaganda was necessary in order to establish the
Weimar Republic in the consciousness of the masses as their state.
(Austermann, 164-65)

Constant confrontations were necessary. Tucholsky not only
demonstrated constancy and consistency with his arguments
and tactics but also displayed an unmatched productivity. From
November 1918 to December 1919 alone, Tucholsky wrote
more than 150 essays and poems, in which he sought to expose
the horrors of war, discredit Prussian authoritarianism and militarism, and in the end, to make a true revolution in German
life (Poor, 49). In the weekly Weltbuhne he had a reliable means
for conveying his voice. He mastered the short article, conveying his message through poems, criticisms, satires, commentaries, polemics, reviews, and even through simple reports.
Tucholsky wrote pieces which directly attacked the threats
he saw to the fledgling Republic. Moreover, Tucholsky clearly
30. The idea of a tabula ra.racorresponds well to Schonert's thesis ofTudlolsky's criticism having its roots in the Enlightenment. Tucholsky from "Wir Negativen,"
quoted in Schonert, "Wir Negativen.. " in Ackermann, Tucho/sIty,81.
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stated his vision of democracy, a'vision which was very much
aware of the realities of German society, and not based <;>n idealistic pipe dreams. He sought:
A democracy, where one is free and conscious of his responsibility.
A democracy, where people are not equal like the lined up numbers
of a Prussian army company-that incarnation of a penitentiary
state [Zuchthausstaa~-instead a democracy, where between a bank
president and his poner, there exists no separation due

to

caste,

only due to one's economic wdl-being and type of occupation. If
they drink tea with 'each other is another matter. That they are both
human is a for us cenain. (T ucholsky, 1042)

Such a quote demonstrates no connection whatsoever to the
goals of the Communist Party. What it does display is a clear
recognition of the class realities that existed in Germany.
Tucholsky was not advocating any nationalization of industries
or redistribution of incomes. Rather, he sought a society in
which everyone was equal before the law and in which everyone
had equal opportunity. Tucholsky saw the values of Germany's
"Vulgar Idealism" of the pre-war period as very much alive and
gaining renewed strength and influence. Tucholskywas seeking,
through his writings, like-minded Germans to aid in his struggle for new values of equality and freedom.
In 1920, Tucholsky listed the demands which he felt had to
be fulfilled in order for the Republic to last. They were as follows:
1.

Transformation of the Reichswehr int~ a People's Militia.
Removal orall unnecessary and counter-revolutionary generals and officers.

2.

Demilitarization -of the police. Forced retirement of all unre,liable officers, especially those active in the Provinces.

3.

Reform of the Justice System---especiallyat the prosecutory
levels. Removal of all those loyal
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to the m~marchy.

4.

Democratization of the bureaucracy. Thorough pursuit and
prosecution of all republican complaints. Firing of all
bureaucrats, along with removal of pensions, whose antirepublican politics have been proven.

5.

Strengthening of the national government vis-a-vis the

7.

states.
Complete restructuring of educational methods and subjects in the schools and universities.
Immediate amnesty for all political prisoners who have been

8.

imprisoned for their republican actions.
Above all, enlightenment and propaganda of the new

6.

republican ideas. Destruction of Prussian legends. Subjects
become citizens. (Tucholsky, 997)

These demands were unspecific in how they should be implemented) but they did provide a framework for Tucholskis
subject matter in his articles. Above all) Tucholsky sought the
elimination of all anti-republican elements remaining in governmental positions. The militarization of German society
had invaded all government institutions. This invasion had to
be countered with a republican one through ridding institutions of military values and replacing them with republican
values.
Tucholsky attacked all remnants of the Wilhelmine Reich,
but his main target was the pervasive militarism in German
society. In a poem titled The Prussian Press, he pointed out the
maIn enemy:
Nur einen Feind hast du deines Geschlechts!
Dec Feind steht rechts! (Tucholsky,429),1

31. A poor translation of this runs:
Only one enemy do you and your generation have!
The enemy stands on me right!
For the whole poem, see Tucholsky, "Preussische Presse," GtSllmmtlte Werke.
Band I. 429.
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The ultimate representative of the right for Tucholsky was
the military. While the German bureaucracy, with its undying loyalties to the Wilhelmine Reich, and the judicial system, with its own favoritism towards the old order, were
often the focus of his attacks, it was the military whose values pervaded and influenced all levels of German society.
The greatest threat to the new Republic's existence and successfullife was militarism. Consequently, Tucholsky focused
more on militarism in his writings than on any other subject
in the first years of the Republic. The violent crushing of the
Spartacist Revolt and the ensuing murders of the Spartacist
leaders Rosa Lu~emberg and Karl Liebknecht by the rightist
paramilitary groups called the Free Corps (Freikorps) served
as the spark for Tucholsky's prolific writings in this period. 32
Harold Poor writes that it was at this time that Tucholsky
" ... decisively entered his career as a writer and journalist"
(Poor, 49}.
Tucholsky could not understand why many Germans
wished for a return to the times of the Wilhelmine Reich in
which militaristic values dominated and which placed so
many undue restrictions upon German citizens. He could not
understand why Germans desired a return to an order in
which they had been treated like and seen as dogs by their
Prussian rulers (Tucholsky, 1042). It was the values of these
Prussian rulers, values such as rigid strictness (catonische
Strenge) and puritanical simplicity, which had led Germany to
a disastrous war and humiliating defeat (Tucholsky, 1042). He
believed these values had to be destroyed.
32. Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Liebknecht were the leaders of the Spartacists. later
the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). In January ofl919. they were among
the leaders of the spontaneous Spartacist Uprising. Ill-planned and laclcing in
mass ~upport. the uprising was easily crushed by government- sponsored forces
called the Free Corps.
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Tucholsky believed that Germans had a barracks mentality,
and this mentality enabled militarism to remain the supreme
value of German society (Poor, 78). According to Tucholsky, the
destruction of these values, however, was almost impossible
because they had been ingrained in the minds and beliefs of
Germans from birth (Tucholsky, 590). Further, the development
of this militarism had not been stopped in any way. In sporting
and outdoor dubs, youths had been taught to organize themselves in units and undertake activities that emphasized maintaining order and undivided respect for leaders. In schools,
youths were taught to emulate and honor military officers, for it
had been the military and the statesmanship of Bismarck that
had unified Germany in 1871.33 As a result, Tucholsky believed
Germans had acquired a need for a superior figure. He wrote,
"The reasons for the cultural struggles are deep. The German,
beaten up by tradition, needs something which he can place over
himself in authority" (Tucholsky, 590). Through culture and
education, the life of a German had been molded to resemble life
in the military. The German became subservient to and needful
of an authority figure. According to Tucholsky, the need for
authority and the resulting adulation of the military made
Germans blind to misuses of power. Germans refused to see
wrong-doings because they wished to remain in their comfortable world, free of responsibility and full of monetary profits
(Tucholsky, 590). The lost war was consequently regretted by
many Germans because it had destroyed the old order of things
(Tucholsky, 590).
Tucholsky's writing~ were designed to enlighten the
Germans to this reality. Unfortunately, he saw little .change. The
33. Prior to 1871, Germany had not been unified. Through three wars in the 1860's
and early 1870's, Prussia succeeded in unifying Germany under their control.
For a summary of these events, see Gordon Craig, Germany 1866-1945.
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Army General Staff remained, only under a different name to
hide its existence from the Allies. 34 Free Corps roamed throughout Germany, committing acts of violence against those suspected of disloyalty and republicanism. Referring to murders
committed by Free Corps, Tucholsky wrote, "This world (that
of the Free Corps) is without scruples, deeply untrustworthy,
and honored and treasured by a great part of the population"
(Tucholsky, 543). The ongoing belief in militaristic values contributed to the concealment of crimes committed by the Free
Corps and the lenient treatment those convicted received.
Tucholsky wrote: "The disgrace of our military and our justice
system are supported by a beaten up and proud bourgeoisie"
(Tucholsky, 824). Tucholsky found this support likewise a disgrace for Germany. Through his writing, he hoped to show the
military and the Free Corps for what they really were: exploitative murderers and destroyers of humanity. In a satirical piece
obviously designed to demonstrate the true attitude of military
men, Tucholsky depicted a discussion among officers who had
just killed citizens deemed disloyal: "Look how respectable the
dogs are dressed. We should take their boots" (Tucholsky, 544).
Such a piece displays Tucholsky's purpose of portraying the officers as inhumane thieves and destroyers of civilization.
Tucholsky was directly targeting a real danger to German society. He was reporting on the violent realities taking place on the
streets of German cities. He was an engaged participant in the
struggle to establish a real republic, with new values and new

34. The General Staff, headed by Ludendorff and Hindenburg from 1915 to the
end of the war.had almost dictatorial power during the war through the development of an almost worshipping of their power and presumed infallibility by
the German public. This staff was abolished after the war. as ordered by the victorious Allies. However. the military was able to maintain the functions of the
Staff through reorganization and trickery. See Gordon Craig. Politics of the
Prussian Anny.
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methods of action, emphasizing peace, equal opportunities, and
democracy.
Harold Poor has written that Tucholsky held the military
responsible for the poverty in German civilization (Poor, 95).
Instead of German civilization progressing from the roots laid
by Goethe, Kant, Schiller, Beethoven, and others, the "Vulgar
Idealism" of the past had re-emerged and negated the possibility of "good" Germans gaining prominence and creating for
Germany a favorable reputation in the world. With the pervasive influence of the military and its authoritarian values,
Germany had become a land of aggression and destruction.
This struggle between the two Germanys, according to
Tucholsky, was a clash between two worlds which did not
speak the same language (Tucholsky, 357). Consequently,
Tucholsky believed no revolution had taken place in 1918,
rather a counter-revolution (Tucholsky, 407). The militaristic
values had been resuscitated through the inability of the
German people and their politicians to overcome their desire
to be ruled authoritatively. Military generals had successfully
maintained their basis of power. Tucholsky compared the situation in the early Republic to that of the 1848 failed revolution. He wrote: "We have lost the ideals of 1848 but kept the
reaction. Politics have become nothing but constant squabbling. Please, God give us a couple of decent fellows so that we
can overcome these terrible times and enter into a splendid
spring" (Tucholsky, 170).
The continued power and influence of the military brought
fear to Tucholsky, for he believed there existed a strong likelihood that the generals would destroy the Republic and unleash
a new war of revenge against the Allied Powers (Poor, 95). The
awe of the military which the public possessed would have to
be replaced with a respect for ~nd willingness to serve the
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Republic. Otherwise the Republic was doomed as were the
hopes for a new humane German society.
The German generals were the worst danger to the new
Republic. They had no knowledge of humanity or of the real
German spirit (Geist). They were unfamiliar with the creators of
the true German spirit, represented by the writers Goethe,
Friedrich Schiller, and others. Tucholsky wrote that these generals instead « ••• thought with the biceps and wrote with the fists"
(Tucholsky, 529), Further, they had no love whatsoever for the
Republic. This lack of love inspired the military-adoring bureaucrats also to despise the Republic. One was therefore severely
limited in his career, if he was a republican (Tucholsky, 994).
This was the situation Tucholsky sought to change and felt had'
to be changed. He himself recognized the difficulty in this task:
"How the journalists can correctly come to grips with this situatiOh and finally close this chapter in world history-it must be a
difficult job" (Tucholsky, 530). Indeed, Tucholsky saw it as the
responsibility of journalists to tackle the problem of militarism
in German society. He was attacking failed institutions that continued to persist without significant reform. Tucholsky was no
dreamy-eyed idealist conceiving new logocratic visions of a
world ruled by the intellectuals. He was directly fighting the
greatest problem he saw in Germany; that of a military instilling
in the German people its values of dominance and subservience.
An example of the military's dominance in the life of
Germans was illustrated in the phenomenon of the Generals
Paul von l-lindenburg and Erich Ludendorff.35 Their continued
35. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were the leaders of the Army General Staff from
1915 to the end of the war. As the public only received censored accounts of the
war, both Hindenburg and Ludendorff became through extensive government
and military propaganda idols of the German populace. They were seen as infallible and omniscient. As a result of this power. they eventually became the unofficial rulers of Germany. even superseding the authority of Kaiser Wilhelm II.
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popularity, despite the lost war, was indicative of the pervasive
nature of the military values in German society. After the war,
the German public was told of the "Stab in the Back Legend"

(Dolchstoflegende) which was propagated foremost by the two
generals. The Army had not lost the war, rather it had been the
politicians of the left and other republicans that had undermined
the inevitable victory. The military had successfully transferred
its responsibility for Germany's defeat from itself to the new
republican politicians who had had no say at any time in military policies. Tucholsky documented this incredible occurrence
as he attended a hearing in which both Hindenburg and
Ludendorff participated (Tucholsky, 532).
Tucholsky did not believe all Germans held Hindenburg and
Ludendorff in high esteem, but that a significant majority certainly did (Tucholsky, 532). Both Hindenburg and Ludendorff
were symbols of the military and its values. As a result, many
Germans reserved a place of honor in their hearts for both men.
The emotions and pride of the Germans had overcome their reason. In reality, both Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been failures. They had not won the war. They were in fact murderers. In
a satirical tone, Tucholsky wrote:
Heroes? Heroes? What have these two to do with the hero concept?
[They were merely] Administrative bureaucrats, well~nourished,
constantly out of danger, and like Ludendorff, on the Eighteenth of
November, leaving the country. (Tucholsky,531)36

That this reality was overlooked by many Germans did not surprise Tucholsky, for he believed these Germans secretly longed
to have the opportunity to kick others around, and to be ruled
36. Ludendorff initially fled Germany after the ceas~fire was signed because he
feared arrest. He, of course, really had nothing to fear due to the high respect he
enjoyed in Germany.
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by a dictator. Only in these situations would such a German
give his best. Germans desired order and to be subservient to
this order, which only the military could provide (Tucholsky,
530, 532), Sarcastically, Tucholsky wrote, "One must have lost
a war to be so celebrated" (Tucholsky, 532).
The German military stood in opposition to Tucholsky's goal
of a new and vitalized German Republic. He wrote: "The entire
German military, as it stands today, has nothing at all to do with
the Republic. Its only worry is to create for itself a special flag,
which reminds itself not of the hated black-red-gold, rather of
the old monarchical towel" (Tucholsky, 994).37 The military
remained forever loyal to its old benefactor, the monarchy. It
could not be relied upon to support the Republic in times of
need. Tucholsky believed the military and its companion, the
Free Corps, had established the Republic as their new enemy
after the armistice had taken away the Allied Powers as enemies
because the fundamental need for soldiers was to create for
themselves an enemy (Tucholsky, 820). He wrote that the Free
Corps would have been formed " ... even in the deepest desert.
The military had to create them. It was a question of blood. The
Free Corps stand like empty taxis on the street or like ladies of
the night at the corner, waiting for their buyee' (Tucholsky,
821). Tucholsky added that the buyer did come, representing
industrial interests and the philistine middle class (Tucholsky,
820-21). These groups allowed militaristic values to enter the
political world of the German Republic (Tucholsky, 820-21).
This power of the military and its values made Tucholsky
see the future of the Republic in black and white. According to
Tucholsky, two worlds were colliding, and absolutely no bridge
37. The "hated black-red-gold" refers to the new Rag of the Republic which replaced
the black-red-white Rag of Prussia and the Reich. This "monarchical towel"
remained as the Rag of the military.
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existed that might reconcile the old and new values. Reflecting
on the murders of Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Liebknecht, he
wrote:
Militarism is not dead, only temporarily put down. The miserable
rest of it hides itself in Noske's gardens, which are so damaging
because there, under the new flag, the old ideals are held high.
There is again this false collective spirit of the "division," this fabulous notion, placed higher than everything human. There is corruption, but always under the guise of correctness. There is the
old, terrible outlook which we no longer want. (Tucholsky,
418)38

Tucholsky sought to fight this pervasiveness -of the military
until ", .. no trace of it existed" (Tucholsky, 418). Germans had
to rid themselves of the barracks mentality, and instead view it
as the greatest hindrance to their progress as a nation
(Tucholsky, 824). Tucholsky, however, did not see the Germans
taking the necessary action to overcome the burdens of the
past. He wrote:
Action and spirit are two factors that are more distant from each
other than ever. We have hundreds of dogmas of reflection, but
hardly any of action. We resemble the centipede, who, despite
considerable thought, still does not know which leg should be first
raised and as a result, remains still. (Tucholsky, 169)

According to Tucholsky, Germany was at a crossroads. It faced
a choice. Germany might return to a past filled with corruption and destruction or enter a future, full of greater freedoms
and membership in a community of nations. But in order to
enter this future, Germany had to undergo a spiritual revolution, one without violence and political murders (Tucholsky,
38. Gustav Noske was Defense Minister from 1919 to 1920. See bdow.

139

169). Without such a revolution, Germany was doomed to fall
back into its dark and burdensome past.
In the political parties of the Weimar Republic, Tucholsky

..."

saw agents working against the Republic. In the politicians of the
German People's Party (DVP) and the German Nationalist
People's Party (DNVP),39 Tucholsky saw activists working for a
return to the monarchy. Some of these politicians tolerated the
Republic, but they yearned secretly for a return of the
Hohenzollerns. 4o These politicians had no convictions and were
merely opportunists using their cleverness and devious tricks to
become important men in the new Republic (Tucholsky, 425).41
Because of the prominence and activity of such politicians in the
workings of government, Tucholsky called the Weimar Republic
a "negative monarchy" and not truly a republic. The Republic
was unable to protect itself because its enemies were active within the Republic itself (Tucholsky, 993). Tucholsky saw the precarious position in which the Republic found itself due to the
continuing strength of the old institutions and above all the military. In a graphic illustration of the lingering old values and
their force of attraction, Tucholsky described shop owners who
« ••••were flattered when they were allowed to have the Royal
Supplier emblem on their shop window" and were consequent39. DVP stands for Deutsche Volksparteiwhile DNVP stands for Deutsche Nationak
Volkspartei. The former was a remnant of the old National Liberal Party while
the latter had its roots in the old Conservative Party and the right wing of the
National Liberals.
40. Hohenzollern was the name of the dynastic family that first served as Kings of
Prussia and later as Emperors of Germany.
41. To T ucholsky, there was no better example of such an opportunist than Walther
Rathenau, foreign minister of the Weimar Republic and killed by right-wing
radicals in 1922. Rathenau had been head of Germany's General Flectric (AEG)
before the war. During the war he was responsible for armaments and supplies
for the military. Tucholsky saw him as a monarchist in republican's clothing.
The later Chancellor and foreign minister Gustav Stresemann provides another
example of such an "opportunist. n
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Iy so happy that « ••• they respectfully observed the droppings of
the imperial horses" (Tucholsky, 1042). Despite the new'
Republic, many Germans still longed for recognition as loyal
monarchists. In order to change such attitudes, Tucholsky
believed that new ideas had to be presented by new men
(Tucholsky, 425).
Logically, these new men should have been the leaders of
the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Traditionally pacifist and
anti-monarchist, the SPD was seen by many as the one party
able to establish a strong Republic in Germany. However, in
Tucholsky's eyes, militaristic values had successfully infiltrated
even the SPD (Tucholsky, 169).42The policies of the SPD were
a bitter disappointment to Tucholsky, for it should have been
the party, with its pacifist heritage, to rid Germany of militarism. Instead, the leaders of the SPD sided with the military,
in order to crush the January uprisings and maintain order.
Tucholsky never forgave the SPD for its deeds during this
time, especially' Defense Minister Gustav Noske, whom
Tucholsky considered the worst offender (Tucholsky, 104).
The SPD had betrayed not only its own constituency, but the
entire German population, who had grown tired of war and
its glorifications. The masses had wanted a new order, and
Tucholsky crafted the sketches of this new order. As days and
months passed, the masses forgot this new order. But
Tucholsky did not. He refused to forget. His writings never
strayed from his advocacy of a Germany absent of the authoritarian military. One cannot consider him merely as an idealist. There had been an opportunity to' shift Germany away
from its glorification of military values. The pervasiveness of
42. Tucholskywas already critical of the SPD in 1914. after its vote to support to join
the coalition in me Reichstag supponing the war dfort. He said, "The political
opposition. the Progressives, and above aU the SPD have totaUy discredited themselves. We can no longer support our radicals, because mey aren't radicals.-
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these values had unfortunately been manifested in the leader..
ship of the SPD.
Tucbolsky did not view the majority of SPD members
responsible for this alliance with militaristic values. T ucholsky
was even in agreement with many of the traditional maxims and
goals of the SPD, but conflict came with the actual governmental policies of SPD leaders; foremost their pro-military policies.
Tucholsky judged ~hese policies against the original principles of
the SPD, that had developed during its long existence. Tucholsky
pointed out the deficits from these principles and the consequences thereof(Hd~, 89)."3
Tucholsky's attacks on the SPD and its policies were highly personalized as they primarily focused on the Defense
Min~ster Gustav Noske and the President of the Republic,
Friedrich Ebert."" Tucholsky's criticism of Noske was far more
pointed than his accusations of Ebert. Tucholsky did regard
Ebert as a man of integrity, even if he believed Ebert displayed
too much flexibility in his workings with the old order (HeS,
103). Noske, on the other hand, received no sign of respect
from Tucholsky. Dieter HeB has written that Tucholsky viewed
Noske as " ... politically incapable, morally unqualified, an antidemocratic, and anti-republican character, and responsible for
the misdevelopment of the Republic" (HeS, 101). Tucholsky
sought the resignation of Noske as the first step in letting the
Republic strengthen itself against the attacks of anti-republican
elements and destroy the old military values which were work43. Tucholsky was a member of USPO from March 1920 to 1922. He saw them as
the true representative of traditional principles of SPOt i.e. dissolution of
Reichswehr. Tucholsky never voiced suppon however for the council movement. a dictatorship of proletariat. or the nationalization of induSlry. He left the
party when the USPO rejoined the Majority SPD. See also Austermann.
TuchDlsky. 26.
44. Friedrich Eben was President from January 1919 to his death in 1925.
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ing with state support to destroy the Republic (Tucholsky,
591).45 The question can be raised whether such a personalized
strategy was effective in any way. Tucholsky was criticizing
Noske without himself becoming actively involved in politics
through a political party. Tucholsky, as a journalist, was not
simply reporting events as he saw them but adding sometimes
acerbic commentary to his observations. This of course did not
change governmental policies, but Tucholsky was utilizing his
right to criticize, which was one of the new rights gained in the
Republic. It must be stated again that Tucholsky was very
much involved in the events of the day even if he did not influence the actions of politicians.
One can see Gustav Noske as a justifiable target for
Tucholsky's pen. In a book written by Noske describing his time
as Defense Minister, Noske referred to himself as the «bloodhound" who did not shun the responsibility of using violent
methods to crush rebellious activities (Noske, 68), Further,
Noske considered Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemberg as those
most responsible for the uprising in January of 1919. Their
deaths, although tragic, were a result of their own exhortations
to murder and violence {Noske, 75-6).46 Such a view, coming
from a representative of the working class and the Republic, sickened Tucholsky.47 A recent study of Gustav Noske's life by the
45. This was written two months before the Kapp Putsch.
46. Noske held Luxemberg and Liebknecht responsible for the peaceful revolution
turning into a bloody civil war. In his memoirs, Noske stated that the SPD
wanted no revolution and that it was its taking control of the government in
1918 that prevented a full-out and chaotic civil war and a communist Germany.
47. In Noske's defense, he overestimated the strength of the Spartacists and their
threat to the overall stability of the new Republic as did many others. There
were also many supply problems in regards to food and other necessities of life
throughout Germany which required the maintenance of order. This is a complicated manner aild deserving of a paper all its own. For purposes of space, it will
not be discUssed further here. See Korb. Die Wdmarer RepubJik, for a good histo~

riographical discussion.
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historian Wolfram Wette confirms Tucholsky's view of Noske as
one overco~e by militaristic values. Wette writes:
Noske had in fact no scruples when it came to using force. Indeed,
he preferred using overwhelming force to achieve a "total" solution
instead of seeking a political compromise. His behavior during the
January uprising makes dear, that he only thought in terms of victory or defeat; values which came from the military environment. It
is probable that the war experience positively influenced Noske's
attitude towards the military-organized cult of force. As a result,
instead of using police forces to maintain order, Noske used the military. (Weue, 315)

According to Wette, Noske was indeed heavily influenced by
the militaristic values which permeated German society.
Tucholsky considered Noske a fool and completely unaware
of his being merely a tool of military interests. Tucholsky wrote:
The reason why the completely incapable Noske must be constantly reproached is that this former Social Democrat did not use the
good opportunity to put out on the streetS all the profiteers of the
old system. He does not see that they consider him a fool.
(fucholsky,590)48

Despite believing Noske to be a fool, Tucholsky realized he was
nevertheless loved by the German population. 49 To Tucholsky,
this popularity was completely unjustified. Tucholsky wrote:
48. It is interesting to note that Tucholsky called Noske a former Social Democrat,
which he obviously was not. Tucholsky is referring to Noske's and other SPD
leaders' disloyalty to the real maxims of the party.
49. Tucholsky was not the only writer to view Noske as a fool and a tool of officers.
In April 1929, a writer from the liberal Berliner Zeitungcalled Noske a prisoner of the military officers. This writef further called Noske's policy of cooperation with the military an egregious error and responsible for the deaths of many
innocent Germans. See. Wolfram Wette, Gustav Noske. Eine politische
Biographie,< 315.
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Noske, the man of the street, the revolutionary minister, is by large
segments of the population almost beloved. He is really a man lacking in intelligence (tin kopfloser Mann). I have actually never seen in
German politics--outside of the Kaiser-such a frightening measure of injudiciousness (Einsichtslosigkti~ in all matters. He has no
idea what is going on. He does not know that there are forces at
work which seek to conserve the terrible and old ways and help a
completely barbarian class stand up again. He is clueless and as a
result, helps these forces in this process. (Tucholsky,546)

According to Tucholsky; Noske was responsible for the lack of
. reform in the military leadership and in military structure,
despite the proven ineptitude of military leaders and the resulting obvious need for reform (470). Observing the manner in
which Noske operated among military leaders, Tucholsky satirically remarked that they all must be related in some way and that
Noske was the successor (Fortsetzer) to Ludendorff's tradition of
ineptitude and shame (Tucholsky, 470).50
The danger of this intimate cooperation between Noske, the
SPD, and the military was the continued suppression of republican ideas and anti-military and anti-monarchical elements.
This suppression was manifested in the lack of sufficient punishment of rightist agitators who beat and killed leftists and
republicans and the corresponding heavy punishment for convicted leftist agitators. 51 Tucholsky held Noske and others in the
50. Noske was indeed respected by some in military circles. According to the military historian Harold Gordon, Noske received a "grudging respect" from the
military for his methodical and practical approach to military matters. See
Harold Gordon. The Reichswehr and the German Republic 1919-1926.331.
51. For a contemporary study of violence in the early years of the Weimar Republic,
see Emil Gumbd. Vier jahre politischer Mord, specifically page 81 .. Gumbel, a
mathematician by trade. lists the number of murders committed by the left at
twenty-two. The average sentence was fifteen years. The number of murders
committed by those on the right was 354. The average sentence was four
months. Four of the twenty-two leftists went unpunished. 326 of the rightists.
Ten leftists were executed. No rightists were.
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SPD leadership responsible for this lack of equal justice
(Tucholsky, 546). He complained that there were always promises made by the SPD and other so-called republicans to change
the situation, but that every day it continued to persist and worsen. Trials were forgotten and the virtuous spirit of the German
Officer Corps was always trumpeted instead as its representatives
were acquitted or sentenced to probation or to serving a suspended sentence. It was "the divine Noske" who allowed this jus- .
tice system to continue its operations in such a manner
(Tucholsky, 546). Noske and other SPD leaders were responsible
for letting an atmosphere of violence and suppression of republican ideas linger and thrive. He wrote, "The cause of weakness
is that no one dares make themselves available to take on the
crowd. No one dares to kick out of the way the established right,
the right that has acquired its rights and privileges dubiously and
without work" (Tucholsky, 994). Those with courage, such as
Mathias Erzberger, wound up dead or beaten (Tucholsky, 994).52
Tucholsky believed Noske to be the worst of cowards. He wrote:
It is completely unimportant to know whether Noske is acting with
a good or bad conscience. He is a parasite, far worse than the
ex:ploitive rich and their agents, worse than the farmer is to his dog.
(419)

It was Noske who had been responsible for the forty-nine deaths
in Berlin during the January 1919 Uprising and for the reawakening of the "German pest": militarism (Tucholsky, 821).53 To
52. Mathias Erzberger was a leader of the Catholic Center Party. a German representative at the Versailles Peace Conference. and later Finance Minister, His
involvement at Versailles and in the Republic made him a target of rightist violence. He was murdered in 1922. Maximilian Harden. the journalist and critic.
was also severdy beaten in 1922.
53. Tucholsky's estimate of49 deaths is low. Other sources list as many as 156 dead.
Perhaps Tucholsky was limiting his totals- to Berlin. See also Wette, Noske. 308.
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Tucholsky, Noske was worse than. the old militarists because
Noske had betrayed his original cause and the Germans who had
believed in this cause.
The harsh criticism of a specific person which Tucholsky
directed towards ~osk.e is significant because of its constant and
barrage-like nature. Tucholsky attacked Noske often during
Noske's tenure as Defense Minister. In Noske, he saw the governmental representative of militaristic values. That these values
had influenced a Social Democratic minister was for Tucholsky
a sign of their pervasiveness and power. The problem of the role
of the military was very real. Tucholsky was not making it up to
sell copies of the WeltbUhne. The violence in the streets, the free
roaming of the Free Corps, the creation of the Stab-in-the-Back
Legend, and the ongoing worship of the Generals Ludendorff
and Hindenburg were for Tucholsky demonstrations of the
power and influence of militaristic values. These values threatened Germany's future and world peace. Due to this threat,
Tucholsky engaged in his criticism and satire, in the hope of
showing his fellow Germans the real danger posed to them
because of their adulation of militaristic values.
Kurt Tucholsky was far from an objective observer. He clearly desired an authentic Republic and free society, with a new
people's militia and new educational forms to instruct the new
generations of Germans in the superiority of republican values.
Tucholsky targeted individuals for criticism to effectively highlight the real problems Germany was facing. Tucholsky did not
have all the answers, and he knew it. He stayed away from specific solutions, perhaps because he believed the establishment of
a real republic would itself determine solutions through debate
and dialogue. He instead strove to focus on the factors inhibiting the implementation of a true republic and influence those
with the capability to create changes in the system to step for147

ward and do it. He sought through satire and criticism to point
out the absurdities of the old system and its restrictions on individual freedoms and Germany's development.
That Tucholsky wrote so much in the first years of the
Republic can be seen as a commitment by him to inspire those
capable to undertake the necessary actions to change the system.
Unfortunately, few were willing to listen to his voice of inspiration. Further, T ucholsky did not have" a large readership. Leading
Social Democrats, certainly aware of his writings, could have
been repulsed by Tucholsky's intellectual status. Other politicians and Social Democrats as well were simply interested in
acquiring and maintaining political power. That meant maintaining order and reviving a ravaged economy. They believed
they did not have the option of experimenting with new ideas
beyond those implemented in the creation of the Republic.
These beliefs can neither be confirmed nor rejected in this paper.
What can be discerned is the fact that Tucholsky did not stray far
off the practical line and never out of the political sphere. He was
not, of the earlier' intellectual tradition of focusing on a special
field and ignoring the political realm. The demands he expressed
in his writings were pragmatic' and viable. They required, however, courage and political will. Unfortunately, this will was lacking among the responsible leaders of the Republic, foremost
among those of the SPD. Tucholsky's criticism was valid and
cannot be dismissed as hopeless idealism. He had a voice which
was heard, but unfortunately not heeded.
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